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Abstract: The Bitcoin system is an anonymous, decentralized crypto-currency. There are some 
deanonymizating techniques to cluster Bitcoin addresses and to map them to users’ identifications in the 
two research directions of Analysis of Transaction Chain (ATC) and Analysis of Bitcoin Protocol and 
Network (ABPN). Nowadays, there are also some anonymization methods such as coin-mixing and 
transaction remote release (TRR) to cover the relationship between Bitcoin address and the user. This 
paper studies anonymization and de-anonymization technologies and proposes some directions for further 
research. 
1. Introduction 
Bitcoin is a decentralized crypto-currency that was introduced by Nakamoto [1] in 2008, and was 
deployed in January 2009. Bitcoin has several characteristics including peer-to-peer protocols, 
decentralized production of Bitcoins by the proof of work (PoW) protocol, the prevention of double 
spending by transparent transactions, pseudo-anonymity, and personal privacy protection, which have 
made Bitcoin increasingly popular. Its market value reached at peak of $12 billion in 2013. 
In 2008, Pfitzmann [2] gave the anonymity a definition, and anonymity of a subject means that the 
subject is not identifiable within a set of subjects, denoted as the anonymity set. In the Bitcoin network, 
Bitcoin addresses act as user accounts. Generally speaking, the aim of anonymization is to prevent 
attackers from discovering the relationship between Bitcoin addresses and real or virtual user identity 
information through the Bitcoin network and the blockchain used to record transactions. Conversely, 
deanonymization is the uncovering of the relationship between the Bitcoin address and the user. 
Anonymity in the Bitcoin system is based on the following facts: (1) Bitcoin address cannot be 
mapped to the real identity; (2) Bitcoin transactions don’t contain any personal information; (3) The new 
transactions are spread radially, thus the sender's IP address will not be exposed. However, the weakness 
of Bitcoin anonymity is reflected in the following areas: (1) The real-name authentication mechanism 
helps Bitcoin service providers to find the addresses that ever deposited and withdrew; (2) Bitcoin address 
exposed on the internet can be related to its owner; (3) The chain of transactions is transparent and 
traceable; (4) Gathering some or all inputs when sending Bitcoins to others, which may expose other 
addresses of the sender; (5) The change address of  transactions could be classified by attackers to the 
sender. 
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The current study on Bitcoin deanonymization focuses on two methods. One is the Analysis of the 
Transaction Chain (ATC), which is to obtain transactions from public blockchain data, to classify Bitcoin 
addresses based on the weakness of Bitcoin anonymity [3-8], and to relate Bitcoin addresses to personal 
identities [7-8]. The other method is the Analysis of the Bitcoin Protocol and Network (ABPN). This 
makes use of the spreading characteristics of Bitcoin transactions to deduce the source IP address of a new 
transaction [9-13], and known attacks include the Bitcoin protocol sniffer, Sybil attack [10-12], fake 
Bitcoin nodes [13]. The method to combat ATC attacks is coin-mixing [14-30], and methods against 
APBN attacks are The Onion Router (TOR) [32], The Invisible Internet (I2P) [33] and Transaction 
Remote Release (TRR) [34]. 
2. ATC and coin-mixing  
 
2.1. Transactions and the transaction chain 
 
A Bitcoin address is an account on the Bitcoin network, which corresponds to a bank account in 
conventional currency systems. A Bitcoin address is generated by double hashing a public key. Only the 
user who owns the corresponding private key can make use of Bitcoins lodged at this address. 
The Bitcoin system has a public ledger that stores transfer records rather than the balance of every 
Bitcoin address. A transfer record is known as a Bitcoin transaction [35], and it includes the transfer time, 
inputs, outputs, amounts, and signatures. Bitcoin transactions with their related inputs and outputs enter 
into the transaction chain, as illustrated in Fig. 1. 
Every transaction has a unique identification (ID). Each input is connected with the output of the 
previous transaction so that the input address of a transaction can be obtained through the output address 
of the previous transaction. All inputs should not be used within all existing transactions because this will 
prevent the successful verification of the transaction. Signatures aim to prove that an input amount belongs 
to the sender because only the private key owner can sign the transaction properly.  
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Fig. 1 Bitcoin transactions and the chain of transactions 
  
Transactions data are stored in the Bitcoin blockchain [36] composed of a lot of blocks, each block 
is like a page in the public ledger, recording a block header and all the transactions released in the Bitcoin 
system during the latest ten minutes. There is an item denotes as the previous hash value in the block 
header, it means, a block includes the previous hash value, and the hash value of this block is also included 
by the next block, thus, all the blocks enter into a chain of blocks, denotes as blockchain. Nakamoto 
adopted PoW[1] to ensure generating blocks is decentralized, regular and secure. The miner generating the 
blocks could be rewarded some Bitcoins, which is 50 BTC in the first four years, and halves every four 
years, and it is 25 BTC nowadays. In addition, all transaction fees of transactions within a block, which 
equal to the balance of the output amount of these transactions minus the input amount, are a part of the 
block reward.   
 
2.2. ATC 
 
ATC is able to cluster many Bitcoin addresses to one user, or find clue to connect Bitcoin addresses 
with real or virtual user identity information. Such methods are transaction and user networks [3], taint 
analysis [4], amount analysis and timing sequence. 
Each vertex represents a user and each directed edge between a source and a target represents a 
transaction with a value in Bitcoins and a timestamp, which denotes as the user network. As shown in 
Fig.2 (a). Similarly, each vertex represents a transaction and each directed edge between a source and a 
target represents an output of the transaction with a value in Bitcoins and a timestamp, which denotes as 
the transaction network. As shown in Fig.2 (a). When starting from a vertex, after a series of transactions, 
and then back to the vertex, called the transaction chain closure. 
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Fig. 2 The transaction and user networks 
Taint analysis is a service provided by Blockchain.info, which is used to calculate the percentage of 
Bitcoins in an address from another address. Obviously, taint analysis is premised on that these two 
addresses are related to each other in a transaction chain. As shown in Fig.2 (b), the degree of taint of C 
and E, D and E are 2/3, 1/3 respectively.  
Amount analysis is another method to deduce the relationship between the inputs and the outputs 
within a CoinJoin transaction, according to the characteristic that the input amount of a Bitcoin transaction 
equals to the output amount plus transaction fee. There is a CoinJoin transaction shown in Fig.4, known 
condition that coin-mixing fee is 1%, we could deduce that the 0th input corresponds to the 0th output,  and 
the 1st  input corresponds to the 1st output, and the 2nd and 3rd inputs correspond to the 2nd output, and then 
the 3rd output is coin-mixing fee. 
Timing sequence: after the coin-mixing service provider (mixer) completes the coin-mixing 
operation he should return Bitcoins to users within a specific time. Hence, the attacker could estimate that 
the transaction returning Bitcoins were within a block range, and interacting with amount analysis so as to 
reduce users’ possible output addresses to a lesser extent. 
Reid [3] analyzed the transaction chain in Bitcoin system and cluster addresses using the transaction 
and user networks mentioned above in 2011. They studied the event that 25,000 BTC belonging to the 
Slush Pool was stolen in 2011, and demonstrated how to trace transaction through transaction chain and 
external information, and they gained some useful clues. Ober [5] and Ron [6] analyzed the Bitcoin 
blockchain, and studied the amount change of Bitcoins in all Bitcoin addresses, and studied the procedure 
how users acquired and spent their Bitcoins, and how they transferred Bitcoins within multiple addresses 
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in order to protect privacy. Ron [6] also traced 364 transactions which amount is larger than 50,000 BTC, 
and found that they were related to a transaction with 90,000 BTC in 2010. 
Androulaki [7] simulated Bitcoin payment scenarios in a university in 2012 and estimated the 
anonymity degree of Bitcoin quantitatively through two heuristic rules, gathering some or all inputs in a 
transaction and change address. They found that even the receiver generates a new address each time when 
receiving Bitcoins, 40% of users could be found the real identify. Meiklejohn [8] clustered addresses 
within the Bitcoin blockchain based on the same heuristic rules and identified 1.9 million addresses, which 
accounted for 16% of all addresses at that time. He also connected these addresses with addresses of same 
Bitcoin service provider and found 500,000 addresses that Mt.Gox used before and 250,000 addresses that 
Silk Road used before. 
The analysis methods mentioned above are not always able to find users’ identities. It is partly 
because of being short of the corresponding relationship between real or virtual identity and Bitcoin 
addresses; another reason is that the heuristic rules would bring about some mistakes such as coin-mixing 
inputs making the rule of gathering inputs get wrong inputs, identifying wrong change address, other 
users’ addresses including in a transaction chain closure. In spite of shortages, the above analysis methods 
can provide a variety of valuable clues, if it is relative to users’ identities of Bitcoin service providers, and 
then there is a high probability to find the true identity of a specific Bitcoin address.  
 
2.3. Coin-Mixing 
 
For the ATC attacks, people obfuscate the transaction chain, and separate the corresponding 
relationship between the input and output of a Bitcoin transaction and even hide the amount of transaction, 
which denoted as coin-mixing.  
Current study regarding coin-mixing focuses on three directions. The first is the use of centralized 
coin-mixing, such as DarkWallet [14], BitcoinFog.com, BitLaundry.com, and Blockchain.info, where 
CoinJoin [15], Mixcoin [16], and coin-mixing algorithms based on blind signature such as BlindCoin [17], 
RSA Coin-Mixing [18] and Blind-Mixing [19] are representative studies. The second regards 
decentralized protocols such as CoinSwap [20], Fair Exchange [21], XIM [22], CoinShuffle [23] and 
CoinParty [24], which are compatible with the Bitcoin protocol, where Bitcoins are mixed through 
decentralized protocols, and no trust is required among users with no possibility of currency loss. The last 
direction regards novel coin-mixing technologies such as blind signature transaction [25], Zerocoin [26], 
Zerocash [27], Pinocchio [28], CryptoNote [29] and SideChain [30], which are not compatible with the 
Bitcoin Protocol, and must be applied in new blockchains. 
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2.3.1 Centralized coin-mixing: research regarding Bitcoin coin-mixing originated from the CoinJoin 
anonymization method proposed by Gmaxwell [15]. General Bitcoin transactions have 1 to 2 inputs and 1 
to 2 outputs, so it is easy to analyze the transferring path of Bitcoins. The CoinJoin transction combines 
many inputs and outputs and put them into a single transaction so that an input in the CoinJoin transaction 
is difficult to be corresponded to an output. Suppose that the numbers of inputs and outputs within a 
transaction are all N, and each input corresponds to a output respectively, and given event A is that 
corresponds a certain input to a certain output. When N = 10, then the possibility of A P(A) = 0.1; after 5 
coin-mixing activities, P(A)=10-5, it seems CoinJoin transaction is the most simple and most effective 
anonymization method. 
According to above principle, centralized coin-mixing providers receive Bitcoins from users through 
website and perform coin-mixing activities. They have some countermeasures against amount analysis: ① 
each user inputs same amount; ② random coin-mixing fee, attackers cannot estimate output amount 
accurately; ③ extend coin-mixing path and increase the frequency of coin-mixing, so that attackers are not 
able to perform amount analysis within a single CoinJoin transaction; ④ reduce the amount of  coin-
mixing, such as 0.1 to 5 BTC each time; ⑤ receive Bitcoins from multiple addresses. 
Methods against the timing sequence: ① buy more time to mix coins, with higher probability to be 
obfuscated with other normal transactions ; ② make the time when the mixers send Bitcoins back to users 
random within a long range, such as from 2 days to 7 days, attackers cannot estimate the time accurately. 
Method against the user and transaction networks is make use of shared wallet, that is, the mixers 
receive Bitcoins through address A, however, send Bitcoins to users through address B. Thus, the input 
and output addresses of a certain user are no relation in the transaction chain. 
The mixers hide users’ IP addresses through TOR or I2P, and receive Bitcoins from users, and then 
perform coin-mixing, therefore develop the anonymity of the Bitcoin system. However, there are two 
serious weaknesses of centralized coin-mixing: ① mixers must know a user’s input address and output 
addresses, and hence cannot provide true anonymity for users; ② users must trust mixers and send 
Bitcoins to mixers in advance, so users face with the risk of currency loss. 
A blind digital signature represents a condition where a signer signs the digest of a message while 
the content of the message is unknown to the signer. In 1982, Chaum [31] first proposed to implement an 
anonymous e-Cash system based on the use of blind signatures, which was intended to protect the 
anonymity of a sender unconditionally. In 2015, BlindCoin [17] was proposed based on bilinear groups to 
make centralized coin-mixing more anonymous; however, it may be deanonymized because that it uses a 
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public log to reach accountability, which may reveal the deposit time and the withdrawal time. In July 
2015, Wu [18] also proposed a blind coin-mixing algorithm based on RSA (RSA Coin-Mixing), however, 
a user’s Bitcoins may be falsely claimed by another. In 2015, Shentu et al [19] adopted elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC) and blind signature, and propose a Blind-Mixing scheme, thus improve the 
performance of ECC blind signature. The scheme also uses the private key from the user’ input address to 
sign the deposit voucher, thus the Bitcoins sent to the mixer cannot be falsely claimed by another. 
As for the users’ risk of currency loss, the present studies such as Mixcoin and BlindCoin intend to 
make centralized coin-mixing reach accountability. However, they could not prevent Bitcoins loss when 
the mixers were gone. Therefore, it is also an important subject. 
2.3.2 Decentralized coin-mixing protocols: because of the risk of currency loss and the application of 
the secure multi-party computation protocol (SMC) [37] in the Bitcoin [38, 39, 40], there are some 
decentralized coin-mixing protocols, and no trust is required among users with no possibility of currency 
loss. 
Fair Exchange [21] was proposed by Barber, which is a two-party Bitcoin exchange protocol, and 
the two parties exchange their Bitcoins without any trust between each other using Bitcoin script and three 
Bitcoin transactions including commit transaction, refund transaction and  claim transaction. 
XIM [22] is a two-party Bitcoin exchange protocol resisting Sybil attacks and DOS attacks, no third 
party is required. Bissias invents a method finding coin-mixing partners in the Bitcoin blockchain, and 
adopts Fair Exchange as exchange protocol, and prevent Sybil attacks and DOS attacks through 
transaction fee. 
CoinShuffle [23] is a decentralized multi-party coin-mixing protocol, and communicates with other 
partners using anonymous group communication protocol Dissent [41] to ensure anonymity. When coin-
mixing, all output addresses from all users would be changed the order randomly, and no one could know 
the corresponding relationship between users and their output addresses. At last, a CoinJoin transaction 
with multi-input and multi-output will be generated and released. 
CoinParty [24] is also as multi-party coin-mixing protocol based on SMC, and there is a centralized 
server acting as a communication platform to gathering coin-mixing requirements and to transfer messages 
among users. When coin-mixing, an escrow address is generated and controlled by all coin-mixing 
partners, and all users send Bitcoins to this address, and then all output addresses are obfuscated through 
the similar method as CoinShuffle does, and at last a CoinJoin transaction, which input address is the 
escrow address, is generated and released. 
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2.3.3 Decentralized coin-mixing Protocols in blockchain: are not compatible with the Bitcoin Protocol, 
and must be applied in new blockchains. Ladd [25] introduced blind signature to Bitcoin transaction the 
first time, and proposed the idea of blind signature transaction, which means that the sender intents to send 
Bitcoins to a group of receivers, and then he signs and releases the transaction, however he cannot connect 
receivers with their addresses. Blind signature transaction is a good theoretical exploration, fusing the 
blind signature, zero knowledge proof and Paillier public-key system. 
Amount analysis is an import ATC method, however, the SideChain [30] developed by BlockStream 
has a kind of secret transaction using Pederson Commitment to replace amount, where the commitment 
stands for an Bitcoin amount within a certain range such as from 0 to 2 BTC but anyone don’t know exact 
number except the private owner. Even so, the commitment could be verified by the third party and ensure 
the owner not to spend more money. Thus, Pederson Commitment renders the amount analysis ineffective. 
Ring signature was first introduced in CryptoNote [29], here are features: ① the signer selects any 
user’s public keys to take part in signing, no notify required; ② unforgeablity, attackers don’t know any 
member’s private key, so they cannot forge signature; ③ unconditional anonymity, in case attackers gain 
all possible private keys, however, the possibility of the signer being recognized is not more than 1/n, 
where n indicates the number of possible signers. Some crypto-currencies bases on CryptoNote such as 
Bytecoin [42] and DarkNetSpace [43] used ring signature to hide the sender, equally performed a coin-
mixing activity.  
Stealth address was also first introduced by CryptoNote, which is originated from the Diffie-
Hellman encryption key exchange protocol based on Elliptic Curve (ECDH). The receiver makes a special 
address public, where the address is called Stealth address, the sender transfers Bitcoins to the address 
with a one-time public key, and attackers are unable to find any transactions according to the address. 
However, the receiver could calculate the correct receiving address and the corresponding private key, and 
gains the Bitcoins transferred by the sender. DarkWallet [14] and BitShares [44] are also using this 
technology. 
Zerocoin [26] is a decentralized coin-mixing protocol built on new blockchain, including Mint and 
Spent these two kinds of operations. Mint operation transforms Bitcoins to Zerocoins, and Spent operation 
transfers Zerocoins in the Zerocoin blockchain or exchanges Zerocoins to Bitcoins. Zerocoin hides the 
addresses of the sender and the receiver, however, some weaknesses exist: ① the man who defines the 
initiation data can acquire all Zerocoins; ② the performance  is really not good, the size of zero knowledge 
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in each transaction is larger than 45KB, and it needs 450 ms time to verify; ③ Can't split the amount, and 
cannot be used to make payment. 
Zerocash [27] is the improved version, here are features: ① the initiation data being defined by 
users; ②  the size of zero knowledge being decreased 97.7%; ③ the verification time being reduced by 
98.6%;  ④ it could be used to pay; ⑤ input amount could be changed or hidden. Another improved 
version Pinocchio [28] reduced the size of zero knowledge to 288 bytes, and the verification time is less 
than 10ms. 
2.3.4 Quantifying the anonymity: in order to estimate the anonymity degree of coin-mixing transaction 
and coin-mixing system, we need to quantify the anonymity degree. Suppose a coin-mixing system with N 
members. When one of members sends a message, ideally, the probability of identifying him is 1/N. 
However, if attackers learn some knowledge through participating in and observing this system, the 
probability of some members being identified will increase. Diaz [45] used the following quantifying 
mode to calculate the anonymity degree. 
 
（1） 
                               
where H(X) indicates the entropy of attacked system, pi indicates the probability of the ith  user 
being the sender, this probability is decided by attackers. HM indicates the maximum entropy of the 
system. Formation (1) indicates that the anonymity degree equals to the ratio of the system entropy with 
attackers’ knowledge to the maximum system entropy. 
Moser [46] adopted above quantifying method and ATC, and estimated the coin-mixing effect of 
mixers such as BitcoinFog.com, BitLaundry.com and Blockchain.info, and then found that he could find 
some clues about coin-mixing paths of the mixers except blockchain.info. 
Quantifying the anonymity degree is a new method to estimate the coin-mixing effects, however, the 
present studies are too few and more attention and further research are required. 
3. The Bitcoin Protocol and Sybil Attacks 
 
3.1. The Bitcoin protocol 
 
Bitcoin nodes communicate with each other via unencrypted TCP connections using port 8333 [47]. 
A Bitcoin wallet which does not accept incoming connections is known as the Client while others are 
called Bitcoin Nodes. Both the client and node save the copy of the IP addresses and ports of other clients 
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and nodes. By default, they always keep 8 outgoing connections. If the number of outgoing connections 
falls below 8 they will reconnect until then number returns back to 8 entry nodes. 
Both the client and node keep a record of other client’s and node’s penalty points. Penalty points are 
used as the basis of a disconnecting mechanism to avoid denial of service (DOS) attacks. When illegal 
blocks and transactions occur, the originating node will incur penalty points. Then, when the points total 
reaches 100, all connections from it will be rejected for 24 hours as a punishment. 
When the client generates a new transaction, the command ‘inv’ is sent to the entry node. The entry 
node checks the transaction id in its own transaction database, if it exists, the id is disregarded, if not, it 
will send the command ‘getdata’ to request the contents of this transaction. The client replies with the 
command ‘tx’ as well as the transaction data or replies ‘notfound’ otherwise. Then the entry node verifies 
the transaction. If the transaction is not correct, it will return ‘reject’, if it is correct, the transaction will be 
transmitted to its entry nodes. 
 
3.2. Anonymous Network 
 
TOR [32] and I2P [33] are anonymous networks, which hide the real IP address for users and encrypt 
the transferred data, preventing original data from being exposing. 
The key technologies are: ① route selection, the client decides the route randomly. As for TOR, 
Each node knows the identity of its previous node and next node, but it does not know the source IP and 
destination IP.  The last node decrypts data and accesses the Internet in plain text. As for I2P, the original 
data was divided into several packages, and each package was transferred in a different route; ②  data 
encryption, the original data was encrypted when across through the relay nodes, and then decrypted at the 
last node, and the relay nodes don’t know the original data. 
TOR and I2P are general anonymous networks, not specially serving for the Bitcoin network. In 
2015, FBI closed 400 illegal websites on the TOR network, and it seems the security of TOR under serious 
threat. 
 
3.3. Sybil Attcack 
 
In active or passive ABPN, there are several attacks in which the new transaction can be linked to an 
IP address so that the attacker could find the relationship between the Bitcoin address and IP address. 
Bitcoin Protocol Sniffer: In the Bitcoin protocol, the data is not encrypted so a well-formed sniffer 
could monitor all outgoing ‘inv’ commands to check whether the transaction id is likely to be a new 
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transaction. Hence, we could obtain the relationship between the Bitcoin address and the IP address, and 
get the real identity with the help of the telecom operator's IP records. 
Sybil Attack: Kaminsky [10] proposes the Sybil attack using a Bitcoin client to connect to all nodes 
in the Bitcoin network. The first source IP address of a new transaction is owned by the original sender. 
Koshy’s [11] experiments, which had gathered 2,500,000 pairs of address and IP within 5 months, show 
that this method works, but there are three problems remaining: (1) Bitcoin via TOR hides the true IP 
address, (2) a large number of clients cannot be connected directly, (3) the same client owns different 
sessions, different IP addresses and different networks (anonymous and not anonymous), so it is difficult 
to link the transactions and IP addresses. 
Sybil attack plus entry nodes: Biryukov [12] implemented a method that makes all Bitcoin nodes 
deny connections from TOR exit nodes in 2014. Meanwhile, they succeeded in detecting the entry nodes 
of a specified client. With these two tricks, they solved the first two problems of the Sybil attack. Those 
suspicious IP addresses collected in a Sybil attack include the IP address of the sender, IP addresses of 
entry nodes, and IP addresses of non-entry nodes. Through the delivery time of every mentioned IP 
addresses, we could probably then find the source IP address of a new transaction. Their results on a 
Bitcoin test network show that there is a 60% chance of identifying the source IP of a new transaction 
successfully using this method. 
Fake nodes attack: Alex Biryukov [13] developed a TOR middle-man attack and ‘Address cookies’ 
to solve the third problem in 2015 via what could be called a fake Bitcoin nodes attack. This works by 
firstly, establishing a sufficient number of fake TOR exit nodes (the amount should reach 3% of all exit 
nodes in TOR network) and fake Bitcoin nodes (1,000 to 1,500). These fake nodes behave like normal 
nodes but they run code from the attackers. Then, address cookies aim to identify a certain client even if it 
uses different IP addresses, different sessions, and different networks.  
 
3.4. Transaction remote release (TRR) 
 
In the Bitcoin protocol, the only way that the attackers can connect the Bitcoin address with an IP 
address is in the process of spreading a new transaction. If we encrypt the new transaction and obfuscate 
the source IP of the sender then the attacker may not succeed.  
Shentu etc. [34] proposed a new anonymization technology for Bitcoin, which denoted as 
Transaction Remote Release (TRR). A client encrypts a new transaction layer by layer, using the public 
key from different TRR nodes (Bitcoin nodes supporting TRR protocol). Then it establishes an 
independent connection to TRR nodes, one by one. When a TRR node receives data, it decrypts the data 
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using its private key and then transmits the remaining data to the next node. The last TRR node releases 
the transaction to the Bitcoin network. Each node knows the identity of its previous node and next node, 
but it does not have access to the transaction content. Only the client and the last node know the content of 
the transaction, but the last node does not know the IP address of the client. 
TRR doesn’t require TOR or I2P, using public key to encrypt data, avoiding entry nodes of the Bitcoin 
nodes, and rendering the ABPN ineffective, thus provides strong anonymity for Bitcoin. However, TRR 
would require to modify the Bitcoin protocol, thus cannot be applied at once. Setting up a new blockchain 
and establishing a Transaction Delivery Network (TDN) are two possible avenues for further research. 
DarkNetspace [42] is an independent blockchain of crypto-currency, based on TRR technology to enhance 
the anonymity of currency transactions. TDN is an independent network based on TRR technology to 
distribute new transactions from any blockchain anonymously, supporting multi-currencies and multi-
blockchains. 
4. Research directions and Prospects 
We think that there are several directions worth further research.  
(1) There are some representative studies on ATC but not yet reaching the practical stage. A large 
number of stolen Bitcoins failed to be identified its owner, so it is necessary to set up a global 
identify database including Bitcoin addresses and users identifies.  In addition, some stolen 
Bitcoins is difficult to be traced through ATC because they were mixed by mixers. 
(2) Research on the anonymity of Bitcoin network is very limited, when the TOR denying and TOR 
middle-man were conducted successfully, the anonymity of the Bitcoin network was seriously 
under threat. TRR is a useful exploration, and more research work is expected.  
(3) The security and practicability of the decentralized coin-mixing protocols have not estimated 
adequately. More deanonymization research is expected to attack decentralized coin-mixing 
protocols. 
(4) Expecting that more cryptography algorithms would be applied on the Bitcoin system and would 
strength the security of privacy of Bitcoin, which are group signature, group blind signature, 
privacy sharing, homomorphic encryption, lattice cryptography and other algorithms. 
(5) The research on the anonymity of Bitcoin is always qualitative. Quantifying research method and 
mathematical model are badly needed.  
(6) Getting rid of the risk of currency loss for users is also an urgent subject for centralized coin-
mixing. 
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